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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case arises from the negligent care and treatment provided to Plaintiff H. Ray
Harrison ("Mr. Harrison") by the Defendants in this matter. On April 28, 2004, Plaintiffs filed
their complaint in this matter. The Complaint included claims for negligence against each of the
Defendants regarding the care and treatment of Plaintiff H. Ray Harrison in November of 2003.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On November 21,2005, Harrison filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint to specifically allege a claim against Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, Inc. ("SARMC") for negligence in reappointing Dr. Jeffrey Hartford to its medical staff.
R. Vol. I, p. 116. On December 5, 2005, SARMC filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Mr.
Harrison's motion arguing that the motion should be denied because negligent credentialing is
not a cognizable claim in Idaho. On January 17, 2006, Defendant Jeffrey Hartford, M.D. ("Dr.
Hartford") filed a Motion for Protective Order requesting that the District Court prohibit
Harrison from obtaining the exhibits to the Board of Medicine disciplinary hearing regarding the
suspension of Dr. Hartford's license on the grounds that such exhibits included confidential and
privileged records regarding substance abuse treatment. R. Vol. I, p. 132. Harrison opposed this
Motion, R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 19, and, on April 3, 2006, the District Court entered an Order
granting the Motion for Protective Order. R. Vol. I, p. 170.
On May 18, 2006, the District Court entered an Order denying Harrison's Motion
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint on the grounds that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provided
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absolute immunity to SARMC for any claim of negligence in the credentialing of Dr. Hartford.
R. Vol. I, p. 183. Dr. Hartford ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with Harrison and
was dismissed from this case. R. Vol. 11, p. 249. The remaining parties proceeded with litigation
in this matter and, on April 27, 2007, Defendant D. Lee Binnion, M.D. ("Dr. Binnion") filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 11, p. 264. Harrison opposed this Motion and on July 6,
2007, the District Court granted summary judgment to Dr. Binnion on the grounds that
Harrison's standard of care expert had failed to establish that he was familiar with the local
standard of care and that Hanison had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact
regarding causation. R. Vol. 11, p. 280.
On July 26, 2007, Harrison filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the District
Court's decision granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. R. Vol. 11, p. 301. On September
18, 2007, Harrison and SARMC filed a Stipulation for Dismissal of Harrison's remaining claims
against SARMC. R. Vol. 11, p. 305. This stipulation expressly provided that Harrison was not
precluded from appealing the District Court's decision regarding the negligent credentialing
claim and dismissed all other claims against SARMC. On September 27, 2007, the District
Court granted Harrison's motion for reconsideration regarding the standard of care expert, but
denied the motion for reconsideration on the causation issue and, therefore, affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. R. Vol. 11, p. 3 10. Harrison timely filed the Notice of Appeal
in this matter on October 30,2007. R. Vol. 11, p. 313.

-
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C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Dr. Hartford has a profound historv with the Idaho Board o f
Medicine relating to alcohol and drug abuse.

Between 1995 and 1999, Dr. Hartford entered into three separate stipulated orders
with the Board of Medicine resulting from his abuse of drugs and/or alcohol. See R. Vol. 11, p.
326, Exhibit 12 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Complaint), Exhibit A (Idaho Board of Medicine's Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Final Order), p. 12. The first order was entered in 1995, and
violated by Dr. Hartford just two months later. See id. The second stipulation and order was
entered in 1997 and was violated by Dr. Hartford in 1998. See id. The third stipulated order was
entered in 1999 and, by Dr. Hartford's own admission, was repeatedly and continuously violated
from 2001 until 2004. See id.
In 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2004, Dr. Hartford also entered into contracts with the
Idaho Medical Association's Physician Recovery Network ("PRN").

See R. Vol. 11, p. 326,

Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 3. In each of these contracts, Dr. Hartford admitted that he suffered
from chemical dependency andlor mental conditions which impaired his ability to practice
medicine safely. See id. See also R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B (Idaho Board of
Medicine's Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law),

7

10. There is no dispute that Dr.

I-Iartford broke the promises made in the 1997, 1998, and 2003 PRN contracts and failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of those contracts. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12,
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Exhibit A, p. 3. Further, Dr. Hartford has admitted that, during all of his monitoring contracts
with the Board, he never quit using alcohol. See id.
2.

Dr. Hartford apalies for, and is granted, unrestricted privilezes
to admit and treat patients within SARMC.

In 200 1, Dr. Hartford applied for privileges with SARMC and appointment to its
medical staff. See R. Vo1. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend for Punitive Damages), Exhibit 3 (Deposition of Jeffrey Hartford,
M.D.), p. 201, LL 5-22. At the time of his application, he was still subject to the Second
Amended Stipulation and Order which was to remain in force for a minimum of five (5) years.

See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit E (Second Amended Stipulation and Order),

1VII.

Dr. Hartford reapplied for privileges at SARMC and reappointment to its medical staff on
February 25, 2003, in the course of the routine two-year reappointment cycle required by
SARMC's Bylaws. See R. Vol. IT, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 7 (SARMC's Supplemental
Answers to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories), p. 2. When Dr. Hartford personally submitted his
reappointment form, SARMC's Medical Staff Coordinator, Sherry Farnes, while leaning
shoulder-to-shoulder with Dr. Hartford, smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford's breath while
discussing a question he had regarding the form. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C
(Board of Medicine transcript), p. 91, LL 1-12. At the time that Ms. Farnes observed the odor,
Dr. Hartford was practicing with active privileges to admit and treat patients within the SARMC
facility.
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Ms. Farnes brought this information to her director, Kevin Hallman, who "took
steps to talk to his supervisor". See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C, p. 90, LL 7-22; p.
95, line 1 - p. 96, line 3. Her director then instructed her to send an email to the PRN coordinator
documenting her interaction with Dr. Hartford, which she did on March 6, 2003. See id. In
response to Ms. Farnes e-mail dated March 6, 2003, the PRN required Dr. Hartford to seek an
evaluation with the Palmetto Institute in Rayville, Louisiana. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12,
Exhibit B, 7 20. A report following the evaluation was sent from Palmetto to the PRN which was
available and accessible to SARMC. See R. Vol. IT, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C, p. 37, line 20 p. 41, line 7.
The Palmetto report, which was admitted as an exhibit in Dr. Hartford's public
hearing relating to his licensure, indicated that Dr. Hartford needed a long-term intensive
residential twelve-step program and medical management for depression. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326,
Exhibit 12, Exhibit B,

7

20.

According to the record, Dr. Hartford never obtained such

treatment. See id., 7 21. According to public record, the PaImetto report indicated that the
evaluators did not believe Dr. Hartford was being truthful when he denied continuing to use
alcohol and found his story to be rehearsed. See id., 7 20. Dr. Hartford's addiction evaluator,
Dr. Charles C. Sledge, in describing Dr. Hartford's long history and dealings with the Idaho
Board of Medicine, testified that Dr. Hartford's long history of relapse, lying to the Board of
Medicine, deceiving health care providers, denying his use and addiction, and violation of his
prior stipulations and Board Orders, despite terrible potential consequences was in no way
surprising. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 2. Nonetheless, SARMC granted Dr.
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Hartford a full two-year reappointment to its medical staff and clinical privileges with no
restrictions or monitoring in July 2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 3 (Deposition
of Dr. Jeffrey Hartford), p. 104, line 22 - p. 107, line 22 and p. 212, line 7 - p. 213, line 25. See

also, R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C, p. 97, line 16 - p. 98, line 5.

3-

Rav Harrison is admitted to SARMCS emevnencv room and is
treated bv Dr. Binnion.

At approximately 11:35 p.m. on November 14, 2003, Mr. Harrison visited the
SARMC emergency room with symptoms of vomiting, diarrhea, poor balance, and dizziness.

See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 1 (Saint Alphonsus Medical Records), Bates Nos.
000561-000568. Mr. Harrison was seen by Dr. Binnion. A blood chemistry lab test revealed
that Mr. Harrison had a life-threatening sodium level of 96 mEqlL. See id at Bates Nos. 000234,
000561-000568, 000721. Dr. Binnion started an IV of normal saline at 20 mcqKcllL at 200
cclhr in the ER. See id. at Bates Nos. 000561-000568; 000647. Additionally, Dr. Binnion
specifically noted that "I think that his sodium has taken quite some time to get this low, and I do
not want to replace it too quickly as that could cause cerebral edema." See id. at Bates No.
000562. Dr. Binnion also ordered a "them.-7" blood chemistry panel to be performed every six
hours to assist the attending physician in monitoring and controlling the rate of sodium
replacement. See id.
Dr. Binnion then spoke with Dr. Hartford who was identified by SARMC as the
admitting physician for Mr. Harrison's regular physician, Dr. Michael Minas, and, following that
conversation, Mr. Harrison was admitted to the hospital. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17,
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Exhibit 2 (Deposition of D. Lee Binnion, M.D.), p. 104, LL 13-21. See also R. Vol. 11, p. 326,
Exhibit 17, Exhibit 1, Bates Nos. 000561-000562. At approximately 3:26 a.m. on November 15,
2003, Mr. Harrison was admitted to SARMC's orthopedics floor. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit
17, Exhibit 1, Bates Nos. 000567-000568.
On November 15, 2003, Dr. Hartford assumed the care and treatment of Mr.
Harrison as the on-call attending physician. That morning, Plaintiff Julie Harrison ("Mrs.
Harrison") met with Dr. Hartford regarding the treatment of Mr. Harrison and smelled alcohol on
Dr. Hartford. R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 4 (Deposition of Julie Harrison), p. 105, line
6 - p. 106, line 13. Mrs. Harrison also smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford on Monday, November
1 7 ' ~and Wednesday, November 19'~. See id. During the course of Dr. Hartford's care and
treatment of Mr. Harrison, Mr. Harrison's sodium level was allowed to rise at a rate twice the
minimm standard of care which, in turn, resulted in Mr. Harrison contracting Central Pontine
Myelinolysis (CPM) - a severe neurological injury to Mr. I-Iarrison's brain stem. See R. Vol. 11,
p. 326, Exhibit I4 (Affidavit of Richard Stems, M.D.). Mr. Harrison suffered permanent
neurological damage. See id.

11. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Harrison's Motion for Leave to

File First Amended Complaint to assert a cause of action for negligence in the credentialing and
privileging of Dr. Hartford?
2.

Did the District Court e n in granting the Motion for Protective Order

regarding the discovery of the exhibits to the Idaho Board of Medicine's disciplinary hearing

-
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regarding Dr. Hartford's medical license and prohibiting Mr. Harrison from obtaining those
exhibits to the extent they included information regarding Dr. Hartford's substance abuse
treatment?
3.

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion

on the issue of causation?

111. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review.

Generally, the Court will review a grant or denial of a motion to amend pleadings
under an abuse of discretion standard. "The grant or denial of leave to amend after a responsive
pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to
reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v.

Idaho First Nat'l Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). However, where
the grant or denial was made purely upon a conclusion of law by the lower court, the decision is
non-binding on this Court and the Court exercises free review over that conclusion of law. See

Suitts v. First Security Bank ofldaho, MA., 110 Idaho 15,23, 713 P.2d 1374, 1382 (1985).
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motio~lfor summary
judgment." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d
641,644 (2006). Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admission on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

-
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and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law[.]" "All disputed facts are
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Robert Cornstock,

LLC v. Keybank Nat'l Assoc., 142 Idaho 568, 130 P.3d 1106 (2006).
B.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Harrison's Motion for Leave
to File First Amended Complaint to Assert a Cause of Action for
Negligence in the Credentiuling and Privileging of Dr. Hartford.

As was set forth in the Course of Proceedings, on November 15, 2005, Mr.
Harrison filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. With the Motion, Harrison
sought to amend the complaint to specifically assert a cause of action for negligence against
SARMC for the improper credentialing and privileging of Dr. Hartford. After briefing and oral
argument, the District Court issued a decision on May 18,2006 denying the motion based on the
District Court's legal conclusion that Idaho Code

5

39-1392c provided complete immunity to

SARMC for the credentialing and privileging of any physician. See R. Vol. I, p. 183. The Court
exercises free review over the District Court's decision because the District Court's decision was
a conclusion of law regarding the legal effect of Idaho Code 5 39-1392c. See Suitts, 110 Idaho at
23, 713 P.2d at 1382 (1985). For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Harrison respectfully asserts
that the District Court's decision was in error and requests that the Court reverse this decision
and allow Mr. Harrison to proceed to trial against SARMC on this issue.

-
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1.

The obligution o f an acute care hospital to use reasonable care in
the credentialing and privileaina o f physicians is supported by
important public policy o f this state.

The Idaho Supreme Court has long followed the rule that "'one owes the duty to
every person in society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation
in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result
in such injury."'

See Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 581, 961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998), citing

Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). The Court has further
recognized that there is a "general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent
unreasonable, foreseeable rislcs of harm to others." See Doe, 131 Idaho at 581,961 P.2d at 1184,
citing Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). Certainly, the
failure to use reasonable care in the credentialing and privileging of physicians treating patients
at SARMC could be reasonably anticipated to cause harm to such patients. As such, a cause of
action for negligent credentialing falls squarely within Idaho's negligence precedent.
Courts from other jurisdictions have expressly recognized causes of action for
negligent credentialing. For example, in Greenwood v. Wierdsma, the Wyoming Supreme Court
noted that a duty to exercise reasonable care in the extension and continuation of medical staff
privileges had been recognized in other states. See 741 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1987) citing 51

' ~ The Wyoming Court then noted that one of the hospital's
A.L.R. 31d 981 and 12 A . L . R . ~57.
"'primary functions is to screen its staff of physicians to 'insure' that only competent physicians
are allowed to practice in the hospital."'

See id. at 1088 (quoting Johnson v. Misericordia

Community Hospital, 294 N.W.2d 501, 512 (Wis. 1980)). In turn, such a requirement "amounts
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to a legal duty imposed on hospitals to exercise that degree of care and skill usually exercised or
maintained by other reputable hospitals in the extension or continuation of medical staff
privileges." See id. See also R. Vol. I, p. 178-80.
SARMC's duty to exercise reasonable care in the credentialing and privileging of
Dr. Hartford is further set forth in the hospital accreditation standards established by the hospital
industry. In its 2005 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (CAMH), the Official
Handbook, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
Leadership Standard LD.l.10 states, "The hospital has governance with ultimate responsibility
and legal authority for the safety and quality of care, treatment, and services." Similar language
is also contained in the 2003 CAMH for Governing Body Standard G0.2 which was in effect at
the time of Dr. Hartford's 2003 reappointment to S A W ' S medical staff: "The hospital's
governing body or authority ultimately is responsible for the quality of care the hospital
provides." See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15 (Affidavit of Kathleen Matzka), Exhibit 2. In
addition, Medical Staff standard M.S. 2 in JCAHO's 2003 CAMH states, "Each medical staff
develops and adopts bylaws and rules and regulations to establish a framework for selfgovernance of medical staff activities and accountability to the governing body." See R. Vol. 11,
p. 326, Exhibit 15 (Affidavit of Kathleen Matzka), Exhibit 3, pp. 1-3.
Similarly, the Idaho Administrative Code, IDAPA 16.03.14 - Rules and Minimum
Health and Welfare / Division of Welfare Standards for Hospitals in Idaho, states, "[Tlhere shall
be an organized governing body, or equivalent, that has ultimate authority and responsibility for
the operation of the hospital." The Medicare Conditions of Participation
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5 482.22(b) Standard:

Medical Staff Organization and Accountability, states, "The medical staff must be well organized
and accountable to the governing body for the quality of the medical care provided to the
patients."

See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15, 7 12. Finally, the Medicare Conditions of

Participation

3

482.12 Condition of Participation: Governing Body, states, "The hospital must

have an effective governing body legally responsible for the conduct of the hospital as an
institution."

See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15, 7 13. Thus, it is clear that the hospital

accreditation standards, as well as state and federal regulations for hospitals, recognize that
SARMC has ultimate authority and responsibility for the medical care provided within SARMC's
facility. Such responsibility necessarily and expressly includes the ultimate responsibility for
credentialing and privileging only qualified medical services providers.
Finally, SARMC's duty is also recognized by its own bylaws.

Specifically,

Section 5:l of SARMC's Hospital Bylaws states, "The Board of Trustees shall have final
responsibility for (i) appointment and reappointment of the members of the MedicalIDental staff
and delineation of their staff privileges (ii) taking such corrective action relating to
MedicalIDental staff members as it deems appropriate[.]" See R. Val. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12,
Exhibit D (SARMC Policies and Bylaws), p. 8. Therefore, absent immunity granted by law, it is
clear that SARMC owed a duty of care to Mr. Harrison in the credentialing and privileging of Dr.
Hartford. As will be set forth below, no such immunity exists for SARMC under the facts of this
case.
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2.

Idaho Code 6 39-1392c does not provide immunilv from negligent
credentialing claims.

In the Order denying Mr. Harrison's Motion to Amend, the District Court relied
upon the immunity provisions within the Idaho Peer Review Act ("Act"), I.C. 5 39-1392, et. seq.
Specifically, the District Court relied upon Idaho Code

5 39-1392c which provides, in pertinent

part:
The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any
health care organization or the receiving and use of such
information and opinions shall not subject any health care
organization or other person to any liability or action for money
damages or other legal or equitable relief.
The District Court held that this statute provides that no person or organization can be held
civilly liable for the "use" of "information or opinions" that are a part of peer review activities,
including credentialing. See R. Vol. I, pp. 190-192. The District Court further concluded that
because "the act of issuing the credential is the ultimate use of credentialing material" the statute
provides complete and absolute immunity against any and all claims of negligence relating to the
credential of a physician. See R. Vol. I, p. 190. In support of this holding, the District Court
noted that "[tlhe language recently added to the Idaho Code makes the act of credentialing a peer
review activity subject to immunity. 'Peer review activities by a health care organization
include, without limitation: Credentialing, privileging or affiliating of health care providers as
members of, or providers for, a health care organization."' See R. Vol. I, p. 190 (citing I.C. $ 391392a(ll)).
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Mr. Harrison does not dispute that the Idaho Peer Review Statute was amended to
include credentialing and privileging as part of "peer review activities." However, the immunity
provision set forth in Idaho Code

5

39-1392c does not provide immunity for "peer review

activities." Rather, the provision provides immunity for furnishing or providing information or
the use of information provided to a health care organization. If the legislature intended to
provide absolute immunity to hospitals for all decisions made in the course of peer review
activities, it would have simply amended Idaho Code

5

39-1392c to clearly provide for such

immunity. I-Iowever, it did not do so. Thus, the question before this Court is whether the
District Court properly interpreted Idaho Code 5 39-1392c as providing an absolute immunity for
hospitals from civil liability for failing to exercise reasonable care in the credentialing and
privileging of physicians on its medical staff.
As the District Court noted in the Order denying Mr. Harrison's Motion to
Amend, when called upon to interpret a statute, the Court begins with an examination of the
literal words. See Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730
(1995). The Court must give the language of a statute its plain, obvious and rational meaning.

See State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). The Court's primary
function is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264,
266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). Such intent should be derived from reading the whole act.

George W: Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88
(1990).

-
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Despite the District Court's holding that Idaho Code
complete immunity to a hospital for

5

39-1392c provides

claim of negligent credentialing, the literal words of the

statute, as well as the intent derived from the whole Act, simply do not support that
interpretation. Mr. Harrison is not seeking to hold SARMC liable for furnishing, receiving, or
any particular information in their credentialing process. Rather, Mr. Harrison is seeking
to hold SARMC liable for negligence for its decision to grant hospital privileges to Dr. Hartford.
Under the District Court's overly broad interpretation of Idaho Code 5 39-1392c, a doctor could
insulate himself from liability simply by instituting a peer review proceeding prior to making his
treatment decision. It could not have been the intent of the Idaho Legislature to allow hospitals
and doctors to escape liability for negligence simply by providing some information about the
patient or physician to a peer review or credentialing committee.
Further, the District Court's interpretation of Idaho Code 5 39-1 392c as providing
immunity for &lnegligent credentialing claims is unsupported by the literal words and very
definitions within the Act when the statute is read as a whole. Idaho Code

5 39-1392c protects

health care organizations, including hospitals, from "use" of "such information." As is clear

5

39-1392c is the

39-1392b and 39-1392a(12).

These statutes

from a reading of the whole Act, the information protected by Idaho Code
information defined within Idaho Code

$5

demonstrate that the Act protects "all peer review" records which, in turn, is defined as "all
evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and
compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer review of any
health care organization." See LC.

$5 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12).
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Thus, at best, the Act only

protects a hospital from being sued for using "interviews, reports, statements, minutes,
memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all
physical materials relating to peer review." In this case, Mr. Harrison is not seeking to sue
SARMC for using any of those items. Nothing in the proposed amended complaint sought to
hold SARMC liable for the use of any particular document, interview, statement, or other
"protected peer review information." Rather, Mr. Harrison is seeking to hold SARMC liable for
the decision it made to provide hospital privileges to Dr. Hartford. And, as is discussed more
fully below, the information upon which Mr. Harrison's claim is based is information that is
publicly available from the Idaho Board of Medicine and, therefore, is not "protected peer review
information."
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the important distinction. If a patient learned
that a physician on the medical staff of a hospital was not licensed in Idaho based upon
information publicly available from the Board of Medicine and then sued the hospital for
allowing that physician to provide care and treatment at the hospital's facility, the hospital could
not reasonably argue that it was being sued for "using" protected peer review information
provided to a peer review committee. Rather, the immunity for the "use of' information as
contemplated by Idaho Code

5

39-1392c is clearly there to provide a hospital immunity for

relying upon statements or opinions provided to the hospital which may prove to be false or
otherwise unworthy of such reliance. Additionally, as is discussed in detail, infra, the purpose of
the immunity provision was to encourage the free exchange of ideas and information within and
between hospitals. Thus, by the plain language of the statute, Idaho Code
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3 39-1392c does not

protect hospitals from liability for its privileging and credentialing decisions. As such, SARMC
is not immune from such a claim.

Idaho Code 6 39-1392c is, at best, ambiguous as to the extent o f
immunity wanted and the legislative historv does not support the
District Court's interaretation.

3.

Idaho Code

5 39-1392c does not "unambiguously"

provide immunity to hospitals

from liability for credentialing and privileging decisions. The statute is, at best, ambiguous as to
the extent of the immunity provided. A statute is ambiguous where reasonable minds might
differ or be uncertain as to its meaning. See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,92 P.3d 521 (2004). In
this case, the statute does not expressly mention credentialing decisions or even peer review
activities as being immune from any suit and makes no mention of absolute immunity. It
unambiguously provides immunity for furnishing or providing information or opinions to any
health care organization or for receiving or using such information or opinions. However, the
statute does not define any of the key terms, particularly what constitutes "use oP' information or
opinions. Certainly, the statute is reasonably subject to differing interpretations regarding the
extent of immunity provided.
If a statute is ambiguous, the Court may look beyond the plain language of the
statute to ascertain the legislative intent. See Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreillle Sch. Dist. No. 84,
142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 (2006). "When a statute is ambiguous, 'it must be construed to
mean what the legislature intended it to mean. To determine that intent, we examine not only the
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history"' I-layden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141
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Idaho 388,398-99, 111 P.3d 73,83-84 (2005) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362,79
P.3d 719,721 (2003)) (emphasis added).
Here, the District Court's decision that Idaho Code

5 39-1392c provides absolute

immunity for all credentialing and privileging activities is not supported by the legislative history
of the Idaho peer review statute. This statute was first enacted in 1973 and included the grants of
immunity for the furnishing of information or provision of opinions as well as the receiving and
use of such information and opinions that currently exist in Idaho Code

5

39-1392c. The

Statement of Purpose which accompanied House Bill 136 stated, in part, "[The bill] would also
encourage the free exchange of information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to
persons providing information or opinions to such review and study committees." Statement of
Purpose for H.B. 136 (1973).

The 1973 version of the peer review statute included the

exemption from civil liability for those furnishing information and opinions and those receiving
and using such information and opinions. 1973 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 265, p. 547. Thus, the
legislative history clearly demonstrates that the grant of civil immunity was intended for the
purpose of "encouraging the free exchange of information" not for the purpose of exempting a
hospital from any duty to properly privilege and re-credential doctors performing surgical
procedures at the hospital.
In 2003, the peer review statute was amended and those amendments included
changes to both the definition of "peer review activities" and the civil immunity provision. The
definition of peer review activities was amended to include "credential, privileging, or affiliating
health care providers as members of, or providers for, a health care organization." I.C.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 18

5

39-

1392a(9)(a). The changes to the civil immunity provision were largely cosmetic and did not
provide additional immunities not already in the statute. C$ I.C.

5 39-1392c (2002) with I.C. 5

39-1392c (2003). Rather, the statute retained the immunity for furnishing and providing or
receiving and using information or opinions. See id. The District Cout held that the inclusion
of credentialing and privileging in the definition of peer review activities demonstrates the
legislature's intent to exempt a hospital from any liability for negligent credentialing. R. Vol. I,
p. 191. However, this argument is not supported by the legislative intent set forth in the
legislative history of the 2003 amendments. The Statement of Purpose accompanying Senate Bill
1102 indicates the purpose was to "clearly define key terminology," "delineate[] the
circumstances upon which records lawfully may be released," and "clarifCy] immunity from civil
liability." See Statement of Purpose of S.B. 1102 (2003). The fact that no substantial changes
were made to the civil immunity provision and the legislative history of that provision indicates
that the purpose of that provision remains as it was when initially enacted, to "encourage the free
exchange of information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to persons providing
information or opinions to such review and study committees." Statement of Purpose for H.B.
136 (1973). Certainly, nothing in the legislative history of the 2003 amendments evidences
intent to abrogate an entire cause of action.
Nothing in Idaho Code 5 39-1392c references immunity for acts or determinations
made during the course of peer review activities. The legislative history of the provision
demonstrates that the immunities that are provided by that section are provided for the purpose
of encouraging the "free exchange of information." Additionally, the legislative history indicates
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that this provision was intended to allow hospitals to share findings with one another. See House
Health and Welfare Committee Meeting minutes (HB 136), p.2, February 14, 1973. As was set
forth previously, Harrison has not sued SARMC for using or receiving any particular information
or opinions in their credentialing activities. Rather, Harrison has sued SARMC for failing to
exercise reasonable care in its decision to credential Dr. Hartford. Thus, based on the language
of the statute as well as the legislative intent behind the statute, the District Court's decision that
Idaho Code

5 39-1392c provides absolute immunity to hospitals for all credentialing decisions

must be reversed.
4.

The common law cause o f action for nealiaent credentialing
cannot be abrogated by doubtful imalication.

The District Court further held the Legislature's power to abrogate a common law
cause of action also supported the interpretation that Idaho Code

5 39-1392c provides absolute

immunity for all credentialing decisions. R. Vol. I, p. 199. This Court has held that the
legislature may abrogate a common law cause of action. See, e.g., Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho
594, 607, 151 P.2d 765, 771 (1944) overruled on other grounds by Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g &

Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d 511 (1970); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555
P.2d 399 (1976). However, the rules of common law carniot be changed by doubtful implication.

,Tee Moon, 65 Idaho at 607, 151 P.2d at 771. Thus, it is the province of the legislature, not the
courts, to abrogate the common law. See id. Here, there is no clear statement of legislative
intent to eliminate the common law cause of action for negligent credentialing. Had the
Legislature intended to abrogate such a cause of action, the Legislature would have enacted a
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specific provision clearly providing that a hospital was not civilly liable for its decisions in
granting or denying hospital privileges to any physician. However, they did not do so. To the
contrary, they made only cosmetic changes to the civil immunity provision. Therefore, at best,
the 2003 amendments to the Idaho peer review statute create immunity from liability for
negligent credentialing claims by implication. I-Iowever, as was clearly set forth by this Court,
such an implication is insufficient to support a finding that the Legislature intended to abrogate
the common law. See Moon, 65 Idaho at 607,15 1 P.2d at 771
This conclusion is supported by case law from other jurisdictions. For example,
in Browning v. Burt, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a hospital's argument that the civil
immunities provision in the Ohio Peer Review Act created a complete immunity for a hospital
against any claims for negligent credentialing. 613 N.E.2d 993 (1993). In so holding, the Ohio
Court reviewed Ohio's statute which provided that "No hospital, no state or local society, and no
individual who is a member or employee of any of the following committees shall be liable in
damages to any person for any acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct within the scope of
the functions of the committee[.]" See Ohio Rev. Code 52305.25. In rejecting the hospital's
claim that this statute provided immunity against negligent credentialing claims, the Ohio Court
noted that:
The purposes of R.C. 2305.25 are clear. The statute extends
limited protection to those who provide information to certain
review boards and committees to encourage the free flow of
information without threat of reprisal in the form of civil
liability. See, generally, Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d
111, 113, 573 N.E.2d 609, 612. The statute also seeks to protect
those serving on committees and committee employees for the
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obvious reason that it could he difficult to staff a committee absent
such protections. However, the cases at bar do not involve a
situation where [St. Elizabeth Medical Center] has been either the
provider of information to a committee (see, e.g., R.C. 1742.141),
or the participant on a committee. It is clear to us that R.C.
2305.25 does not provide blanket immunity to a hospital for
negligence in granting and/or continuing staff privileges of an
incompetent physician.

Browning, 613 N.E.2d at 1007 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the Ohio immunity
statute is significantly broader than that found in the Idaho peer review statute. Specifically, the
Ohio statute did provide for immunity for "acts, omissions, decisions and other conduct" within
the scope of the functions of the committee, while Idaho's statute only provides immunity for
providing, receiving, and using protected peer review records. Cf:Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.25
with LC.

5 39-1392c (2003).

Despite the broadly worded immunity provision within the Ohio

peer review statute, the Ohio Court acknowledged the clear legislative purpose behind the
immunity provision and fiuther recognized that the grant of immunity was not intended to
provide hospitals with blanket immunity in granting or continuing the privileges of an
unqualified physician.
Based on the legislative history of Idaho Code § 39-1392c, the purpose of the
Idaho statute is substantially similar to the purpose of the Ohio immunity statute, and as noted,
the Idaho statute's immunity is much narrower than that granted in the Ohio statute. The
legislative history of both statutes demonstrates that they were enacted to provide for the free
exchange of information between hospitals and peer review participants. Nothing in the statutes
supports the idea that they were enacted to provide hospitals immunity from any liability from

-
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negligent credentialing claims. The Ohio Court of Appeals reiterated this holding in Phillips v.

~ u r t ' 1995
,
Ohio App. LEXIS 2418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) and expressly found that the Ohio
statute did not provide immunity even if the hospital provided information or was a member of a
protected committee. See id. at 29-33. The Ohio Court of Appeals articulated the policy behind
their refusal to expand the hospital's immunity, stating:
SEMC's view would impede, not further, the policy underlying
immunity. Rather than promoting improved health care, shielding
hospitals from liability for negligent peer review would remove an
important incentive to ensure that they credential only qualified
physicians who will offer patients only appropriate medical
treatment. . . . . Permitting a hospital to cloak itself with
immunity from all actions arising from its conduct within the
peer review process, when its negligence may lead to "an
unreasonable risk of harm or injury" to patients, is
incongruous with the goal of enhancing medical care. We do
not believe that is what the legislature or the Court had in mind.
Phillips, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS, at 32-34 (emphasis added).
Based on the clear legislative history behind the creation of Idaho Code § 391392c, as well as established Idaho case law which disfavors abrogation of common law claims
by implication, Mr. I-Iarrison respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's
decision that Idaho Code

3

39-1392c provides complete immunity to the hospital from any

claims for negligent credentialing.

'Harrison recognizes that Phillips v. Burt is an unpublished decision from the Ohio Court of Appeals. However, as
all out of state decisions are simply offered as persuasive, non-binding, authority, Harrison respectfully requests that
the Court treat the unpublished decision in the same manner. See, e.g., Hyde v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 785, 152
P.3d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing that an unpublished decision from the United States District Couit for
the District of Idaho did not stand as authority, but adopting the rationale from that unpublished decision).
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The Idaho Peer Review privilege provisions do not provide
immunity fvom neglnlipent credentialing claims.

5.

In the proceedings below, SARMC argued that, in addition to the immunity
provided by Idaho Code

3 39-1392c, the Idaho appellate courts would not recognize a cause of

action for negligent credentialing because the Idaho Peer Review statute provides for the
confidentiality of hospital's credential decisions. However, the Idaho Peer Review statute does
not provide for confidentiality of a credentialing decision because such decision is apparent
when a physician is practicing at SARMC's facility. To say that a decision is confidential when
it is clear that a physician has been granted privileges by the physician providing care within
SARMC's facility is nonsensical. Rather, the plain language of the Idaho Peer Review statute
protects "all peer review"

which, in turn, is defined as "all evidence of interviews,

reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and compilations and the
contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer review of any health care
organization." I.C.

33 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12).

Thus, contrary to SARMC's argument, not

all information relating to peer review is privileged.
In this case, there is substantial evidence and information to support a negligent
credentialing case without obtaining or relying upon protected peer review information.
Specifically, Harrison intends to present evidence available in the public record from the Idaho
Board of Medicine. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibits A, B, C and E. This evidence
includes transcripts, exhibits, proposed findings, findings of fact and conclusions of law and
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Idaho Board of Medicine's Board
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S t a f s Petition for Violations and Enforcement of Orders hearing held on May 14 and May 26,
2004. See id. Such evidence demonstrates that Dr. Hartford had entered into three separate
stipulated orders with the Board of Medicine between 1995 and 1999. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326,
Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 2-3. The first order was entered in 1995, and violated by Dr. Hartford
just two months later. See id The second stipulation and order was entered in 1997 and was
violated by Dr. Hartford in 1998. See id. The third stipulated order was entered in 1999 and, by
Dr. Hartford's own admission, was repeatedly and continuously violated from 2001 until 2004.

See id.
The evidence further demonstrates that "[fjor nine years [Dr. Hartford was] given
every opportunity to achieve sobriety but failed over and over again. No treatment, program or
contract, before his recent treatment . . . has been successful. There is no serious dispute with
regard to [Dr. Hartford's] medical condition, history of drug and alcohol abuse, resulting
consequences thereof, and that [Dr. Hartford] has suffered multiple and damaging relapses in his
treatment." Id. at 3.
In 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2004, Dr. Hartford entered into contracts with the Idaho
Medical Association's Physician Recovery Network ("PRN"). See id. at p. 3. In each of these
contracts, Dr. Hartford admitted that he suffered from chemical dependency and/or mental
conditions which impaired his ability to practice medicine safely. See id See also R. Vol. 11, p.
326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B,

1 10.

On August 12, 1998, the Board received a report that Dr.

Hartford had tested positive for marijuana use on July 28, 1998, and August 5, 1998. See id. at 1
10. The Board of Medicine's staff investigated the matter and obtained patient calendars from
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Dr. Hartford showing that Dr. Hartford was seeing and treating patients on each of those two
dates when he tested positive for marijuana. See id. There is no dispute that Dr. Hartford broke
the promises made in the 1997, 1998, and 2003 PRN contracts and failed to comply with the
terms and conditions of those contracts. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 3.
Further, Dr. Hartford has admitted that, during all of his monitoring contracts with the Board, he
never quit using alcohol. See id.
The evidence from the Board of Medicine proceedings also includes testimony
from Sherry Fames, the credentialing coordinator of SARMC, who testified that in early March
2003, she was leaning shoulder to shoulder with Dr. Hartford reviewing his re-appointment
application when she smelled alcohol on his breath. See R. Vot. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B,

7 1 8 See also R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C.

Ms. Farnes reported this incident to the

PRN program, but SARMC failed to require or request a laboratory test from Dr. Hartford to
confirm the presence of alcohol. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B, 7 18.
Following this report to the PRN program, Dr. Hartford underwent a five-day
assessment at the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center, Inc. See id., 7 20. The assessment by
the clinical psychologist indicated that that testing "does not lead one to believe his story." See
id.

The assessment recommended a long-term intensive residential program and medical

treatment for depression. See id. The assessment further recommended psychiatric group
therapy and medical management of Dr. Hartford's depression by an Idaho PRN approved
psychiatrist. See id.

The Board of Medicine documents and testimony further demonstrate that

Dr. Hartford admitted that he began drinking again in 2001 and did not stop until he was
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admitted for treatment in January of 2004. See id., 7 24-25. Mr. Harrison will produce evidence
that despite this information and these recommendations, SARMC granted Dr. Hartford full and
unrestricted reappointment in July of 2003. Mr. Harrison will also produce expert testimony
that, given the public information available to SARMC at the time of the reappointment
application and decision, SARMC's reappointment of Dr. Hartford in 2003 was negligent under
any circumstances. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15,147.
Additional evidence that is not protected peer review information and which is
available to Mr. Harrison includes SARMC's own credentialing policies. Under these policies, a
physician must have an unrestricted license to practice medicine. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit
12, Exhibit D. However, it is undisputed in this case that Dr. Hartford's license was not
mestricted at the time of his reappointment in March 2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12,
Exhibit A, p. 3. Rather, at the time of SARMC's granting of privileges to Dr. Hartford in 2001
and the reappointment in 2003, Dr. Hartford's license was conditioned upon his coinpliance with
the Second Amended Stipulation and Order entered into by Dr. Hartford in 1999.
Additionally, SARMC's medical staff bylaws (Section 3.A.l I) and Policies and
Plans, require, as a minimum qualification that must be met by all applicants to the Medical staff
before an application will be processed and continually, thereafter, a minimum of $1 million of
medical malpractice insurance coverage and to file with the Office of Medical Affairs a copy of
all such policies and endorsements. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit D,

9

3.A.l I.

SARMC's reappointment application specifically requires the physician to identify any
"conditions" related to the policy. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit D, 7 10(f). Despite

-
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Dr. Hartford's long history of alcohol and drug abuse and repeated violation of Idaho Board of
Medicine Orders and PRN contracts, SARMC reappointed Dr. Hartford to its staff with a
"Lloyds of London" insurance policy with a "condition" that specifically voided the policy upon
violation by Dr. Hartford of any of the terms of his Second Amended Stipulation and Order
including the provision requiring complete abstinence from the consumption of alcohol or drugs.

See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 6 (Insurance Policy), p. JH 18.
Thus, evidence unprotected by the peer review privilege and either publicly
available or discoverable in the course of litigation conclusively demonstrates that SARMC
violated its own policies when granting Dr. Hartford's reappointment application in March 2003.
Therefore, as set forth above, Mr. Harrison has more than sufficient evidence to support a cause
of action for negligence in the privileging and credentialing of Dr. Hartford against SARMC
without using any documents protected by the peer review privilege.
SARMC asserted to the District Court that it must be immune from a negligent
credentialing claim because the privilege has no meaning if SARMC is forced to divulge
privileged information to defend a claim of negligence in the credentialing and privileging of a
physician. However, nothing in Mr. Harrison's claim requires SARMC to divulge protected peer
review records (i.e. all evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes,
investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating
to peer review of any health care organization) in order to defend against a negligent
credentialing claim. SARMC can present evidence about its general procedures and policies for
reappointment, as well as presenting testimony of its own experts that based on the evidence
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presented by Mr. Harrison, it was reasonable to grant privileges to Dr. Hartford. Certainly, the
expert can testify as to the reasonableness of SARMC's decision without discussing privileged
documents or revealing discussions which occurred during the credentialing process. Therefore,
allowing a claim against a hospital for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of a
physician does not abrogate the privilege set forth in the Idaho peer review statute.
Further, based on the language of the peer review statute, the privilege relating to
protected peer review information belongs to SARMC and, like any other privilege, SARMC is
free to waive that privilege if necessary to defend against a claim. In the event SARMC or any
other hospital is faced with a lawsuit for negligent credentialing based on publicly available and
discoverable information and believes that it can only defend such a lawsuit by presenting
evidence protected by the peer review privilege, it can waive the privilege. This is no different

than a defendant who believes that his best defense requires submission of information protected
by the attorney client privilege to the court. No party can compel that information from the
defendant, but the defendant is free to waive the privilege if he so chooses. There is simply no
reason that SARMC should be given greater protections for the peer review privilege than exist
for any other privilege recognized by law.
In fact, several courts have found that the establishment of confidentiality for peer
review records did not abrogate a cause of action for negligent credentialing. For example, in

Greenwood, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the Wyoming privilege statute eliminated any cause of action for negligent
credentialing. 741 P.2d at 1087. In answering this question, the Wyoming Court first reviewed
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the relevant statute and found that the statute precluded discovery of "all reports, findings,
proceedings and data of such hospital medical staff committees." Id. (quoting W.S.

5 35-2-602

(1977)). The Court ffurther observed that "hospital staff committees" included "any committee
within a hospital, consisting of medical staff members or hospital personnel, which is engaged in
supervision, discipline, admission, privileges or control ol' members of the hospital's medical
staff[.]" Id. (quoting W.S.

5

35-2-604 (1977)). Thus, the Court concluded, the statutes clearly

covered accreditation activities under the privilege.
Despite the fact that the statute excluded accreditation activities from discovery in
a civil suit, the Court nevertheless concluded that the statute did not abrogate a common law
claim for negligent accreditation against the hospital. In so holding, the Court first noted that a
duty to exercise reasonable care in the extension and continuation of medical staff privileges had
been recognized in other states. See id. (citing 51 A.L.R. 3rd 981 and 12 A.L.R.~"'57). The
Court then noted that one of the hospital's "'primary functions is to screen its staff of physicians
to 'insure' that only competent physicians are allowed to practice in the hospital."' Id. at 1088
(quoting Johnson v. Misericordia Comm. Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 512 (Wis. 1980)). In turn,
such a requirement "amounts to a legal duty imposed on hospitals to exercise that degree of care
and skill usually exercised or maintained by other reputable hospitals in the extension or
continuation of medical staff privileges." Greenwood, 741 P.2d at 1088.
Having found an affirmative duty to reasonably extend or continue medical staff
privileges, the Court then noted that "[ilf the legislature had wanted to prohibit actions against
hospitals for breaching their duties to properly supervise the qualifications and privileges of their
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medical staffs, it would have done so expressly. We will not construe the privilege statute to
impliedly prohibit this category of negligence actions." Id. In support of its holding, the Court
noted that the "continued availability and vitality of such causes of action serve an important
public policy - the preservation of quality health care for the citizens of this state." Id. Lastly,
the Court concluded that although the privilege statute was broad and clearly excluded certain
information from discovery, it was not intended to exclude from discovery all relevant
information and thereby preclude the possibility of proving negligence. See id. at 1089. Thus,
the Court reversed the summary judgment granted to the hospital.
Similarly, in In re Larrimore v. Vaughn Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., the Alabama
Supreme Court faced a question involving the Alabama peer review statute which prevented
discovery of credentialing and peer review documents such as written reports, records,
correspondence, and materials concerning the accreditation or quality assurance or similar
function of any hospital. 768 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 2000). See also Ala. Code 5 22-21-8. In arguing
that the Court should allow discovery of credentialing information, the plaintiff asserted that her
cause of action for negligent credentialing would be abrogated if she were not allowed to
discover such information. See Larrimore, 768 So. 2d at 378-379. The Court disagreed and,
relying on the reasoning of the Arizona Court of Appeals, held that the plaintiffs cause of action
was not abrogated because the statute did not prevent her from obtaining information outside the
peer review confidentiality provisions such as court records in previous malpractice claims,
administrative records or testimony about a physician's education and training, and the hospital's
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general credentialing or review procedure policies. See id. at 379-380 (citing Hurnana Hospital

Desert Valley v. Superior Court, 742 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. Az. 1987)).
The same result was reached by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Sun Health

Corp. v. Superior Court, 70 P.3d 444 (Az. Ct. App. 2003). In Sun Health, the Court of Appeals
upheld the district court's decision that certain documents requested in discovery were privileged
under Arizona's peer review statute which protected information and documents prepared in
connection with a peer review (including credentialing) investigation. See id. at 446-447. In
response to the plaintiffs argument that such a result abrogated her cause of action, the Arizona
Court of Appeals stated that the cause of action was not abrogated because the "plaintiff has
reasonable alternative ways to obtain information without seeking privileged information." See

id at 449. The Court noted that the plaintiff "can seek information outside the review process
and information from the original sources including court records of previous malpractice claims
and administrative records or testimony about the physician's education and training. A plaintiff
can obtain discovery about the hospital's credentialing process . . . . and may retain experts to
opine on any issues that may arise." See id As such, the plaintiffs cause of action was not
abrogated. See id.
Mr. Harrison recognizes, as did the Courts cited above, that the peer review
statute serves to insulate documents, discussions, communications, and opinions created or
furnished to a peer review committee from discovery in a civil snit.

Mr. I-Iarrison also

recognizes that the peer review statute protects hospitals and doctors from liability for providing
information for peer review activities and for using those inaterials in peer review activities.

-
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However, nothing in the Idaho peer review statute eliminates the hospital's duty to ensure that
physicians practicing in the facility are fully qualified and able to care for patients. Mr. Harrison
recognizes that, in practice, a large majority of negligent credentialing cases brought in Idaho
will likely fail to survive summary judgment due to the inability of the plaintiff obtain privileged
peer review information and the lack of any evidence available from sources outside the
credentialing process. This is not that case. Here, Mr. Harrison can present an abundance of
evidence, supported by expert testimony, regarding SARMC's negligence in granting Dr.
Hartford's reappointment privileges in the spring of 2003. Specifically, Mr. Harrison intends to
present evidence which includes Dr. Hartford's disciplinary record with the Idaho Board of
Medicine, including Dr. Hartford's chronic propensity to violate the stipulated disciplinary
orders and Dr. Hartford's history of drug and alcohol abuse documented within the Board of
Medicine disciplinary records. Further, Mr. Harrison intends to present documents and findings
from the Board of Medicine's proceedings against Dr. Hartford in May of 2004. All of this
evidence is completely outside the Idaho peer review statute and is therefore available to prove
Mr. Harrison's case.
Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Harrison is able to produce evidence obtained
from sources other than documents protected by the peer review privilege, Mr. Harrison must be
allowed to prosecute his claim for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of Dr.
Hartford. To hold otherwise would insulate any hospital from liability even if it did

to

ensure that a physician was qualified to perform surgery at the hospital despite the immense and
irreparable harm likely to be caused by such an unqualified or unfit physician. Adopting
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SARMC's position and refusing to recognize a claim for negligent credentialing would, in effect,
mean that a hospital could allow a person without a medical degree - let alone a medical license
-to perform surgery in the hospital's facility and the hospital would face no civil liability. Such
a result cannot have been intended by the Idaho Legislature. As the Court in Stottlemyer v.

Ghramm noted: "It is clearly foreseeable that if a hospital opens its facilities to demonstrably
incompetent professionals, including independent contractors, that injury to patients will occur

... [Tlhe hospital cannot knowingly or negligently permit one lacking the minimal professional
credentials to use its facilities to provide services which pose such an inherent danger of injury."
60 Va. Cir. 474,478-79 (2001). The Court further stated:
Therefore, it is not surprising that all hospitals have a process for
credentialing physicians and they are required to do so in order to
obtain and retain their accreditation.. .This is most certainly true in
today's medical environment, where many patients have no
practical option in choosing surgeons, anesthesiologists,
pulmonologists, nurses, etc. who will provide service. It would
seem only logical and commonsensical that a patient being
wheeled on a gurney into an operating room and looking up at
four (4) to eight (8) heavily masked professionals standing in
front of millions of dollars of high-tech medical equipment
would normally assume that someone has made an effort to
assure that these people meet minimal professional standards.

See id. at 479 (emphasis added). The Court further recognized that a majority of states have
recognized some form of negligent credentialing/supervision cause of action against a hospital in
a medical malpractice case. See id. at 477.
In this case, Mr. Harrison went to the SARMC emergency room seeking treatment
and trusting that someone at SARMC had, in fact, made an effort to ensure that those physicians
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providing treatment to Mr. Harrison during his hospitalization would meet minimal professional
standards. Sadly, SARMC failed in that duty by credentialing Dr. I-Iartford. As such, Mr.
Harrison respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision denying Mr.
Harrison's Motion to Amend and remand this case for the purpose of allowing Mr. Harrison to
pursue his claim.
6.

Granting SARMC immunitv from civil liabilitv does not serve the
p
p
contradicts the Durposes o f the Act.

Finally, the Court should reverse the District Court's decision because granting
SARMC immunity from civil liability for negligent credentialing does not serve the purposes of
the Idaho Peer Review Act ("Act"). As the District Court recognized, it is a "universal rule of
statutory construction that a statute must be construed in the light of its intent and purpose."

DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 176, 505 P.2d 321, 324 (1973). Idaho Code

9 39-1392

sets forth the Statement of Policy for the Act as follows:
To encourage research, discipline and medical study by certain
health care organizations for the purposes of reducing morbidity
and mortality, enforcing and improving the standards of medical
practice in the state of Idaho, certain records of such health care
organizations shall be confidential and privileged as set forth in
this chapter.
I.C. 9 39-1392. Thus, the clear statement of policy from the Legislature regarding the enactment
of the Idaho Peer Review Act was to reduce the morbidity and mortality rates and enforce and
imurove standards of medical practice in the State of Idaho. In order to encourage those
purposes, the Legislature mandated that certain records of peer review committees remain
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confidential and privileged in order to allow the free exchange of ideas and opinions within and
between health care organizations. Thus, peer review committees (including credentialing
committees) are free to discuss particular decisions and actions taken by physicians, create
studies and statistics to track events, and otherwise have free and open discussions in order to
frankly and honestly assess the standards of health care in the facility without fear that such
documents or discussions will later be used as evidence in a lawsuit against a physician or a
hospital.
The 2003 amendments which added credentialing activities to the types of
activities protected by the Act, did not change the intent and purpose of the statute. It is
reasonable and understandable that a hospital may be able to make important and difficult
decisions regarding the credentialing of a physician when discussions and documents created by
or used by the committee are not subject to disclosure. However, granting absolute immunity to
a hospital for any credentialing decision does not hrther the purposes of the statute. It simply
cannot be argued that relieving a hospital of all liability for credentialing decisions somehow
furthers the purpose of enforcing and improving the standards of medical practice in this state.
By removing any threat of civil liability to a patient, the hospital, in fact, has less reason and
motivation to enforce and improve the standards of medical practice. SARMC, like all hospitals,
is a business which must make decisions which impact its finances on a regular basis. Without
civil responsibility, a hospital could make a financial decision that credentialing physicians with,
at best, questionable qualifications will provide more patients to the hospital and, therefore,
provide more income to the hospital.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 36

In the proceedings below, Mr. Harrison provided a supplemental citation of
authority to the District Court identifying the thirty-two states which had expressly recognized a
cause of action for negligent credentialing by a hospital.

R.Vol. I, p. 178-180.

The

Supplemental Citation of Authorities further identified the only two states which had expressly
found no cause of action for negligent credential. R. Vol. I, p. 181. However, both of these
states, Texas and Kansas, have statutes which unambiguously abrogate such a cause of action.

Id In the District Court's opinion denying the Motion to Amend, the District Court rejected Mr.
Harrison's supplemental citation of authority on the grounds that none of the states had statutes
identical to the Act. R. Vol. I, p. 199-202. Mr. Harrison has never argued that each of the states
which have recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing have peer review statutes
identical to the Act. Rather, the purpose in providing the Supplemental Citation of Authority
was to inform the District Court that, despite the fact that nearly every state has some form of
protection for peer review activities, the vast majority of courts have found a cause of action for
negligent credentialing and, the only two states which have rejected such a claim have done so
based upon very express language abrogating such a claim. The fact that so many states have
recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing is further support for Mr. Harrison's
position that valid public policy reasons exist for finding that Idaho Code

5

39-1392c does not

provide absolute immunity for negligent credentialing claims.
Finally, even if this Court believes that the statute unambiguously provides
immunity for credentialing activities based on the "use of' language in the immunity statute, the
Court should nevertheless reverse the District Court's decision. Where the language of a statute
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is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. See George W Watkins
Family, 118 Idaho at 539-40, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. In this case, as is clear from the legislative
intent behind both the Act and specifically the civil immunity provision, granting SARMC
absolute liability for all credentialing activities is not only contrary to the clearly expressed
legislative intent behind the Act, but will also lead to absurd results. As such, Mr. Harrison
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision that Idaho Code S, 391392c provides absolute immunity to SARMC for its decision to credential Dr. Hartford and
remand this case for trial on this issue.
B.

The District Court Erred in Granting the Motion for Protective Order
Related to the Subpoena for the Exhibits to the Disciplinary Proceeding
Before the Idaho Board of Medicine.

In the course of litigation in this matter, Mr. Harrison issued a subpoena to the
Idaho State Board of Medicine, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), seeking the
documents entered as exhibits to the record of the administrative disciplinary hearing regarding
the suspension of Dr. Hartford's medical license in May of 2006. See R. Vol. I, p. 326, Exhibit
13 (Affidavit of Keely Duke in Support of Dr. Jeffrey Hartford's Motion for Protective Order),
Exhibit A (Deposition of Mary Leonard), p. 5, LL 3-12. At the deposition, counsel for Dr.
Hartford and counsel for Dr. Binnion objected to the exhibits to the administrative hearing. See

R. Vol. I, p. 326, Exhibit 13, Exhibit A, pp. 14-17. Dr. Hartford then filed a protective order
seeking an order preventing the disclosure of those exhibits on the grounds that they included
confidential and privileged records relating to Dr. Hartford's substance abuse treatment. See R.
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Vol. I, p. 132. After briefing and argument, the discovery master appointed by the District Court
in this matter issued a Recommendation on Dr. Hartford's Motion for Protective Order and the
District Court granted the Protective Order on April 3, 2006. See R. Vol. I, p. 170. In granting
the Order, the District Court held that Dr. Hartford did not waive any claim of privilege
regarding those treatment records. Id. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Harrison respectfully
asserts that the District Court erred in finding such documents to be privileged and requests that
Court reverse this decision and, should the negligent credentialing claim against SARMC
proceed, order that the exhibits to ihe Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding be produced.

I.

Dr. Hartford has waived anv privilege as to documents admitted as
exhibits to the Idaho State Board o f Medicine discialinarv
proceeding.

In the proceedings below, the District Court held that Dr. Hartford did not waive
any privilege as to his treatment records presented as exhibits to the Board of Medicine
disciplinary proceedings. In so holding, the District Court relied upon the Court's earlier Order
Denying Motion to Compel in Part, issued August 5,2005. R. Vol. I, p. 170. In this Order, the
Court denied Mr. Harrison's motion to compel Dr. Hartford to produce any and all records
related to substance abuse treatment. R. Vol. I, pp. 109-114. In so holding, the Court stated that
Dr. Hartford had not waived his privilege based on his disclosure of those treatment records to
the Board of Medicine. See R. Vol, 11, p. 109.
Idaho law is clear that the proceedings, evidence, testimony, and showings related
to an Idaho Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding are discoverable. While Idaho Code 5 9340C limits the disclosure of certain Board of Medicine proceedings pursuant to public records

-
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request, Idaho Code 5 9-343(3) provides, in relevant part, that "Nothing contained in sections 9337 through 9-348, Idaho Code shall limit the availability of documents and records for
discovery in the normal course of judicial or administrative adjudicatory proceedings, subject to
the law and rules of evidence and of discovery governing such proceedings." Therefore, the
plain language of the Idaho statutes provide that all of the evidence, testimony, documents,
records, showings, and proceedings of the Idaho Board of Medicine's formal disciplinary
proceedings are discoverable in a civil lawsuit subject only to the law, rules of evidence and of
roles of discovery governing such a proceeding.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the discovery of all relevant
information that is not otherwise privileged. See I.R.C.P. 26. In this case, the exhibits to the
Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding are clearly relevant to Mr. Harrison's claim of
negligent credentialing against SARMC. Based on the testimony provided regarding these
records, Mr. Harrison believes they will assist in demonstrating Dr. Hartford's long history of
drug and alcohol abuse as well as his continued inability to abstain from the use of drugs and
alcohol. Mr. Harrison believes these exhibits will also assist in proving that Dr. Hartford had a
long history of lying about his drug and alcohol abuse. Therefore, because the exhibits are
relevant to this cause of action, they are discoverable absent a viable claim of privilege.
The District Court held that Dr. Hartford had a valid claim of privilege to these
records and that the privilege was not waived by his participation in the Board of Medicine's
disciplinary proceeding. Waiver of a privilege with respect to confidential medical information
can occur when the patient voluntarily consents to the disclosure of such information. See, e.g.,
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Pearce v. Ollie, 121 Idaho 539,560-61,826 P.2d 888,909-910 (1992). In this case, Dr. Hartford
voluntarily consented to the admission of the treatment records to the Board of Medicine
proceedings. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20 (Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to
Defendant Jeffrey Hartford, M.D.'s Motion for Protective Order), Exhibit B (Board of Medicine
Transcript) pp. 6-8. At the Board of Medicine hearing, the hearing officer began the proceedings
by asking if any documentary evidence would be offered in the course of the hearing. See id., p.
6, LL 1-4. Dr. Hartford's counsel responded that such evidence would be offered, and would
consist of "primarily the documents that are part of the records of the Board of Medicine and for
the PRN - Physicians Recovery Network - pursuant to the consent by my client to have those
records[.]" See id., p. 6, LL 6-3.
The District Court held that any treatment records admitted as exhibits to the
Board of Medicine proceeding were either privileged disclosures or compelled disclosures and
therefore did not constitute a waiver. See R. Vol. I, pp. 109 and 170. However, the transcript of
the Board of Medicine proceedings does not support this argument. First, Dr. Hartford's counsel
at the Board of Medicine proceeding recognized that the Board of Medicine proceeding was a
public proceeding and requested that the exhibits be sealed so that they would not be subject to a
public records request. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit B, p. 6, LL 15-24. Further, Dr.
Hartford stipulated to allow the Board of Medicine staff to elicit testimony regarding the contents
of the records. See id., p. 7, LL 12-21. Thus, it is apparent that Dr. Hartford recognized the fact
that the Board of Medicine proceeding was a public proceeding that would become part of the
Board of Medicine's public record. Although a waiver of a privilege does not occur if the
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disclosure is itself a privileged communication, it is impossible to believe that Dr. Hartford had
any reasonable basis to believe that the admission of the treatment records as well as testimony
regarding those treatment records within the Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding was a
privileged communication. Rather, the record clearly demonstrates that Dr. Hartford was well
aware of the public nature of the disciplinary hearing and took steps to ensure only that the
treatment records would not be subject to a public records request. Therefore, Dr. Hartford's
stipulation to the admission of the treatment records in the Board of Medicine disciplinary
proceeding cannot have been a privileged disclosure.
Further, the disclosure of Dr. Hartford's treatment records within the Board of
Medicine proceedings carniot have been compelled. First, there is no evidence that Dr. Hartford
was, in fact, compelled to disclose the treatment records at the Board of Medicine hearing. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a general obligation to appear and answer
questions truthfully pursuant to a subpoena does not convert otherwise voluntary statements into
compelled ones. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984). Rather, a witness's
answer is compelled only if he is required to answer over his valid claim of privilege. See id.
Therefore, the fact that Dr. Hartford may have been obligated to appear at the Board of Medicine
proceedings does not convert his otherwise voluntary disclosures into compelled disclosures.
In order to establish that the disclosure of the treatment records within the Board of
Medicine proceeding was compelled, Dr. Hartford must first establish that he asserted the
privilege as to the treatment records and that that records were admitted over his valid claim of
privilege. See, e.g., Rambus v. InJineon Technologies, AG, 220 F.R.D. 264,275 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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Here, Dr. Hartford has failed to make any such showing and, in fact, the record is very clear that
Dr. Hartford stipulated the admissibility of all of the exhibits offered by Idaho State Board of
Medicine staff, which included the treatment records he now seeks to protect as privileged. See

R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit £3, p. 7, line 23 - p. 8, line 25. There is nothing in the
Board of Medicine record that provides any indication that Dr. Hartford objected to the
admissibility of the treatment records on the grounds of privilege. See id. Nor is there any
provision of the Idaho statute governing the Board of Medicine proceedings which indicates that
any claim of privilege would not apply to Board of Medicine disciplinary proceedings. See I.C.

$5 54-1806 and 54-1837.

Simply put, Dr. Hartford made a voluntary decision to consent to the

admission of his treatment records as exhibits to the Board of Medicine proceeding. As such, he
waived any claim of privilege as to those exhibits and Mr. Harrison is entitled to discovery of
those exhibits. See, e.g., Weinrich v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 60 Pa. D. & c.4" 427 (Pa.
Dist. Ct. 2001) (holding that physician waived privilege as to psychotherapy treatment records
by voluntarily testifying about treatment at hearing before Board of Occupation and Professional
Affairs hearing to determine whether his medical license should be revoked). Because Dr.
Hartford waived any claim of privilege as to the exhibits admitted into the record at the Board of
Medicine proceeding, Mr. Harrison is entitled to discover those documents pursuant to Idaho
Code $$ 9-393(3) and 54-1837(e).
Finally, even if the provision of substance abuse treatment records as exhibits to
the Board of Medicine disciplinary proceedings was somehow a privileged or compelled
communication, any claim of continued privilege cannot stand in light of the fact that Dr.
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Hartford stipulated that testimony could be presented regarding the contents of the treatment
records at the Board of Medicine hearing. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit B, p. 7, LL
12-21. The record is also clear that Dr. Hartford voluntarily testified under examination by his
attorney at the Board of Medicine proceeding. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit B, pp.
356-452. Dr. Hartford's testimony included information regarding his treatment at various
substance abuse treatment centers. See id. At no time did Dr. Hartford assert a claim of
privilege as to his treatment records or his confidential communications with the physicians
treating his substance abuse problems.
The record further reflects that Dr. Hartford was fully aware that the disciplinary
proceeding was a public proceeding and that the testimony would not be kept confidential by the
Board of Medicine. The only concerns expressed by Dr. Hartford related to the actual treatment
records and Dr. Hartford only requested that the documents be sealed so as to be protected from
disclosure pursuant to a public records request. Dr. Hartford cannot claim a privilege as to
testimony and records that he allowed to be entered without objection and which he voluntarily
gave to the hearing officer.
Additionally, the information that is publicly available on the Board 01
Medicine's website includes Dr. Hartford's stipulations with the Board of Medicine, the
proposed findings, conclusions of law, and proposed order by the hearing officer, the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order from the Board of Medicine, and the amended findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order from the Board of Medicine. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit
20, Exhibit C (Documents publicly available on the Idaho Board of Medicine's website). The
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hearing officer's proposed findings cite extensively to the transcript and exhibits to the
disciplinary proceeding and includes quotes and other references to Dr. Hartford's substance
abuse treatment history. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B. Dr. Harford cannot assert
any legitimate claim to the confidentiality of his substance abuse treatment when such
information is included in documents available to anybody with access to the Board of
Medicine's website. While Mr. Harrison recognizes the public policy behind ensuring the
confidentiality of communications made to physicians and psychotherapists in the course of
substance abuse treatment, that public policy is eliminated when the information is voluntarily
provided in a public hearing and, therefore, becomes part of the public record accessible by
anybody with a computer and internet connection. As such, Mr. Harrison respectfully requests
that the Court reverse the District Court's decision granting the Motion for Protective Order and
allow the production of those exhibits.

C.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Dr.
Binnion on the Issue of Causation.

As was set forth in the Course of Proceedings, the District Court granted summary
judgment to Dr. Binnion based on the District Court's determination that Mr. Harrison had failed
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's breaches of the
standard of care had caused any damage to Mr. Harrison. The primary basis for the Court's
decision was that Dr. Laureno, one of Mr. Harrison's causation experts testified that, had the rate
of sodium replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m. when the lab report showed a
sodium level of 105, he could not say that it was more likely than not that Mr. Harrison would
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have suffered from CPM. R. Vol. 11, pp. 295-299. According to the District Court, because Dr.
Binnion's care of Mr. Harrison ceased at 3:25 a.m., and the CPM might have been prevented had
the sodium replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m., Dr. Binnion's breach of the local
standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Harrison could not have caused damage to Mr. Harrison.

See id.
Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that the District Court's decision granting
sumlnary judgment to Dr. Binnion be reversed because there is sufficient evidence in the record
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. Specifically, Mr. I-Iarrison's
emergency room physician expert, Dr. Paul Navar, testified that Dr. Binnion breached the local
standard of care by failing to slow the rate of sodium replacement at the time Dr. Binnion
received the initial lab report showing a sodium level of 96. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25,
(Affidavit of Patricia M. Olsson in Support of D. Lee Binnion's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment), Exhibit A (Deposition of Paul Navar, M.D.), p. 61, LL 5-1 1. Dr. Navar further
testified that the applicable standard of care was that the sodium level should be increased no
more than .5 milliequivalents per hour, not to exceed 10 to 12 milliequivalents in a 24 hour
period. See id,at p. 64, LL 5-12; p. 71, LL 5-14; p. 74, LL 4-17. Dr. Navar also testified that
Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard of care as set forth above were a substantial factor in
causing the condition of Central Pontine Mvelinolvsis in Mr. Harrison. See id.at p. 49, line 13 p. 50, line 19.
In turn, Dr. Laureno, Mr. Harrison's primary causation expert, has testified that
Mr. Harrison suffers from CPM and that the CPM resulted from the rapid rise in sodium level
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which was incurred during his hospital visit to SARMC. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30
(Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to Defendant D. Lee Binnion, M.D.'s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment), Exhibit A (Deposition of Robert Laureno, M.D.), p. 46, line 6 - p.
49, line 4, and Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3 to the deposition. In fact, Dr. Laureno testified that there
was no other cause of the CPM than the rapid elevatioil of the sodium level in Mr. Harrison's
case. See id. at p. 50, LL 9-18. Thus, the testimony establishes that Dr. Binnion breached the
local standard of care by failing to properly slow the rate of sodium replacement after receiving
the initial lab report showing severe hyponatremia and that such breach was a substantial factor
in causing Harrison's injuries. The testimony further establishes that the cause of Mr. Harrison's
CPM was the rapid replacement of sodium. Thus, there is expert testimony that Dr. Binnion's
breach of the standard of care was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's CPM.
The District Court concluded that Mr. Harrison had failed to establishe causation
because there was no expert testimony that, had the sodium replacement been slowed at 6:00
a.m., Mr. Harrison still would have suffered from CPM. Thus, the District Court effectively
concluded that because the damage might have been avoided by another party taking different
action, there is no causation between Dr. Binnion's breach of the standard of care and Mr.
Harrison's damages. However, Idaho law does not require that a plaintiff establish that the
negligence of a physician was the sole cause of the plaintiffs damages. Rather, when there are
multiple possible causes for a plaintiffs injury, the proper causation standard is that the doctor's
negligence is a proximate cause of the injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the
damage. See Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,288, 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005). In this case,
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Dr. Navar testified that, in his expert opinion, Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard of care
was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's CPM. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 20,
Exhibit A (Deposition of Dr. Paul Navar), p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19. Thus, the fact that Dr.
Hartford or somebody else might have been able to prevent the onset of CPM by taking some
hypothetical action to slow the rate of sodium replacement at 6:00 a.m. on November 15, 2003,
does not mean that Dr. Binnion's breaches of the standard of care as testified to by Dr. Navar
were not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's damages.
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the type of "but for" causation test Dr.
Binnion attempts to apply to this case in Newberry, supra. In Newberry, the plaintiff sought
treatment from the defendant physician for an injury to his eye. The physician provided
treatment and antibiotics and sent the plaintiff home. Approximately two days later, the plaintiff
suffered a complete loss of vision in his eye and sought emergency medical treatment. Surgery
was ultimately performed and the plaintiff suffered permanent total vision loss in his eye. The
cause was determined to be a bacterial infection which began at the time of the injury. See
Newberry, 127 P.3d at 189-90, 142 Idaho at 286-87.

After trial which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, the physician appealed and
argued that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the substantial factor test. The Idaho
Supreme Court rejected the physician's argument stating that where more than one cause is
asserted, the substantial factor test is appropriate. See id. at 288, 127 P.3d at 191. In so holding
the Court rejected the doctor's argument that the "but for" test was appropriate because there was
only one cause of the injury to the plaintiff, namely the bacterial infection. The Court held that
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the doctor's argument ignored the fact that there was evidence presented that the doctor's
negligence contributed to the injury. See id. at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. The Court also stated that
the doctor was free to argue to the jury that he was not negligent or that his negligence was not a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs damages, but because there was evidence that the
negligence was a possible contributing cause, the substantial factor test was appropriate. See id.
In this case, Dr. Navar has testified that Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard
of care was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison to suffer from CPM. Dr. Navar
specifically testified that Dr. Binnion's failure to adjust the rate of correction to comply with the
standard of care of no more than .5 milliequivalents per hour upon receipt of the initial lab report
showing a sodium level of 96 was a breach of the standard of care and that such breaches were a
substantial factor in causing Harrison's injuries. Additionally, Dr. Laureno has testified that the
sole cause of the CPM was the rapid elevation of sodium levels. As such, Mr. Harrison has
presented evidence that Dr. Binnion contributed to the rapid rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level
by failing to reduce the rate of sodium replacement upon receipt of the initial lab value showing
a sodium level of 96. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Dr. Binnion's actions
were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injuries. Like the doctor in Newberiy, Dr.
Binnion is free to argue to the jury that she was not negligent or that her negligence was not a
substantial factor in causing the injuries to Mr. Harrison. But, where, as here, evidence has been
presented that Dr. Binnion's actions were a contributing cause to the harm suffered by Mr.
Harrison, summary judgment is not appropriate just because Dr. Binnion's action may not have
been the sole cause of Mr. Harrison's damages.
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In the Order granting summary judgment, the District Court asserted that Dr.
Navar's testimony that Dr. Binnion breached the local standard of care by failing to properly
communicate within her physician's orders, at the time they were written, her concerns about the
rapid elevation of sodium and that all laboratory values be immediately communicated to the
attending physician upon receipt by attending nursing staff was immaterial because there was no
testimony that such breach actually caused Mr. Harrison's CPM. See R. Vol. 11, p. 296.
However, as was set forth previously, Dr. Navar did testify that the breaches of the local standard
of care by Dr. Binnion were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's damages. See R. Vol.
11, p. 327, Exhibit 20, Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19.
In fact, Dr. Binnion's failure to properly communicate her concerns to Dr.
Hartford and the nursing staffhighlights the fundamental flaw in the argument that Dr. Binnion's
actions were not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's damages. The District Court's
decision was based upon the assumption that the sodium replacement rate could have been
slowed considerably by Dr. Hartford at 6:00 a.m. when the next labs were available showing a
sodium level of 105 - a 9 milliequivalent per liter increase in 6 hours. See R. Vol. 11, pp. 297298. However, Dr. Binnion never established that this lab value was reported to Dr. Hartford at
6:00 a.m. in a manner which would have allowed him to make any kind of adjustment. In fact,
Dr. Hartford testified that he did not visit Mr. I-Iarrison for the first time until approximately
11:OO a.m. on November 15, 2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit B (Deposition of
Jeffrey Hartford, M.D.), p. 169, LL 10-22. Dr. Hartford further testified that he never recalled

-
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seeing or receiving a lab report of 105 sodium level during his visit with Mr. Harrison on the
morning of November 15,2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit B, p. 174, LL 2-5.
Therefore, Mr. Harrison has established that Dr. Binnion's failure to properly
provide written orders instructing the nurses to immediately call Dr. Hartford when the 6:00 a.m.
lab values were available was also a contributing cause to Mr. Harrison's injuries. Simply put,
Mr. Harrison has provided evidence that Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard of care in
failing to properly communicate the importance of monitoring the sodium values and
communicating those values to the attending physician was a substantial factor in causing Mr.
Harrison's injuries. Certainly a reasonable jury could infer from the testimony provided that had
Dr. Binnion properly communicated within her physician's orders at the time they were written,
her concerns about the rapid elevation of sodium and ordered that all laboratory values be
immediately communicated to the attending physician upon receipt by attending nursing staff,
both the nursing staff and Dr. Hartford would have been aware of the concerns about the rapid
elevation of sodium, Dr. Hartford would have been contacted at 6:00 am regarding the sodium
level of 105 and the rate of sodium replacement would have been slowed, thereby preventing the
damage to Mr. Harrison from the resulting onset of CPM. See Sheridan v. St. Luke S Reg'l Med.

Ctr., Inc., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001) (holding that a jury could reasonably and naturally
infer from a chain of circumstances that nurse's negligence was a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury).
Finally, Dr. Navar also testified that Dr. Binnion breached the local standard of
care by failing to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the ICU unit. See R. Vo1. IT, p. 327,
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Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 -p. 50, line 19. Dr. Navar testified that Mr. Harrison should
have been in the ICU unit where he could have more frequent blood draws to more closely
monitor his sodium levels to ensure that the levels were not rising at a rate inore than .5
milliequivalents per hour. See id. at p. 88, LL 2-16. Additionally, Dr. James Souza, a physician
who is board certified in pulmonary and critical care and who worked in the SARMC intensive
care unit as an intensivist in November of 2003, testified that the standard of care for raising the
sodium level of a severely hyponatremic patient such as Ray Harrison in Boise, Idaho, in
November of 2003 was no more than .5 milliequivalents per hour, not to exceed 10
milliequivalents per day. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit C (Deposition of James
Souza, M.D.), p. 19, line 12 - p. 21, line 21. Dr. Souza also testified that he would have
admitted Mr. Harrison to the ICU in order to ensure that Mr. Harrison's rate of sodium
replacement was properly monitored. See id. at p. 14, LL 8-21. Thus, the testimony above
establishes that Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard of care by failing to ensure that Mr.
Harrison was admitted to the ICU unit was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injuries
because, had he been admitted to the ICU, the testimony of Dr. Navar and Dr. Souza demonstrate
that the sodium levels would have been closely monitored and that the rate of correction would
not have exceeded .5 milliequivalents per hour. As such, Mr. Harrison did present evidence
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's breaches of the
local standard of care were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injuries. See Shevidan,
135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). Therefore, Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that the Court
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reverse the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion and remand this
case for trial on this claim.

IY.CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respecthlly requests that the Court
reverse the District Court's decision denying the Motion for Leave to Amend regarding the claim
of negligent credentialing against SARMC; reverse the District Court's decision granting the
Protective Order as to the Board of Medicine exhibits; and reverse the District Court's grant of
summary judgment to Dr. Binnion on the issue of causation.
DATED this

1 a4day of June, 2008.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
By:
Attorneys for Appellant
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